Abstract. Conformance control for ATM cells is based on a real-time reactive algorithm which delivers a value depending on inputs from the network. This value must always agree with a well de ned theoretical value. We present here the correctness proof of the algorithm standardized for the ATM transfer capability called ABR. The proof turned out a k ey argument during the standardization process of ABR.
Introduction
We want to present in this paper an unusual at least to our knowledge application of formal methods in telecommunications, though it is closely related to a protocol. There is now quite a long tradition in using formal languages in this area, even standardized ones. They are based on communicating extended nite state machines e.g. Estelle, SDL, Promela or process algebra e.g. Lotos. Veri cation based on model checking 16, 8 or simulation 14 has also been successfully employed. Typically, y ou model the protocol at hand, using one of the above formalisms, and then you try to verify that bad things like unexpected messages, deadlocks and so on never happen. To this e ect you may use temporal logic formulas or observers and automated veri cation tools. This approach turns out very useful because the global behavior of a system made of several concurrent components is di cult to grasp.
In the problem we deal with here, complexity does not lie in parallelism or message interleaving, but in a single sequential, short, real-time and reactive algorithm. This algorithms runs on a key device for an ATM Transfer Capability called ABR see below. It handles a small scheduler and delive r s a v alue which depends on inputs from the network. We essentially have to prove that the value delivered by the device always agrees with more precisely: is not smaller than a theoretical value whose computation is not feasible under realistic assumptions. The correctness proof presented here has been a key argument in the standardization process of ABR.
The technique used is basically the calculus of weakest preconditions. However real time comes into the picture: not only the mathematical expression of the problem involves functions of the time, but invariants themselves involve such functions: a scheduler predicts values in the future. In order to make the result as convincing as possible a must in the context of standardization we do not hesitate to make proof steps explicit and before anything we start from a v ery simple and declarative speci cation S d . A t a later stage, we describe the state space of the device under study, as well as associated invariants. Unfortunately speci cation S d is technically not well suited to the correctness proof.
A bit of theory has to be developed, in order to get an equivalent but more tractable computational speci cation S c . The invariant to be proved is then stated in terms of S c and the proof can be carried out thanks to preliminary lemmas related to S c . This paper aims at giving the details of this work. Note that the speci cation and the whole proof have been completely formalized with Coq 5 , an automated proof assistant based on type theory 15 .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the problem as well as the stakes for telecommunications. Section 3 states the speci cations called S d and S c above and explains how to get the latter from the former. Section 4 describes the state space with its invariant and sketches the main steps of the proof the standardized algorithm and technical details of its correctness proof are respectively given in appendix A and B. We end with concluding remarks and related work in section 5.
Context and Motivation

Conformance Control in ATM
In an ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode network, data packets cells sent by a user must not exceed a rate which is de ned by a contract negotiated between the user and the network. Several modes for using an ATM network, called ATM Transfer Capabilities" ATCs have been de ned. Each A TC may be seen as a generic contract between the user and the network, saying that the network must guarantee the negotiated quality of service QoS, de ned by a numb e r o f c haracteristics like maximum cell loss or transfer delay, provided the cells sent b y the user conform to the negotiated tra c parameters for instance, their rate must be bounded by some value. The conformance of cells sent by the user is checked using an algorithm called GCRA generic control of cell rate algorithm. In this way, the network is protected against users misbehaviors and keeps enough resources for delivering the required QoS to well behaved users.
In fact, a new ATC cannot be accepted as an international standard without an e cient conformance control algorithm, and some evidence that this algorithm has the intended behavior.
For the ATC called ABR Available Bit Rate, considered here, a simple but ine cient algorithm had been proposed in a rst stage. Reasonably e cient algorithms proposed later turned out to be fairly complicated. This situation has been settled when one of them, due to Christophe Rabadan, has been proved correct in relation to the simple one: this algorithm is now part of the I.371.1 standard 13 . The rst version of the proof was hand written. The main invariants discovered during this process are included in I.371.1. Later on, the proof has been completely formalized and mechanically veri ed with Coq 5 .
The Case of ABR
In some of the most recently de ned ATCs, like ABR, the allowed cell rate ACR may v ary during the same session, depending on the current congestion state of the network. Such ATCs are designed for irregular sources, that need high cell rates from time to time, but that may reduce their cell rate when the network is busy. A servo-mechanism is then proposed in order to let the user know whether he can send data or not. This mechanism has to be well de ned, in order to have a clear tra c contract between user and network. The key is an adaptation of the public algorithm for checking conformance of cells. An abstract view of the protocol ABR is given in g. 1 actually, resource management RM cells are sent b y the user, but only their transmission from the network to the user is relevant here; details are available in 17 . The conformance control algorithm for ABR has two parts. The rst one is called DGCRA dynamic GCRA. It just checks that the rate of data cells emitted by the user is not higher than a value which is approximately Acr, the allowed cell rate. Excess cells may be discarded by DGCRA. Note that, in the case of ABR, Acr depends on time: its value has to be known each time a new data cell comes from the user. This part is quite simple and is not addressed here. The complexity lies in the computation of Acrt update" in g. 1, which depends on the sequence of values ER n carried by resource management cells coming from the network. By a slight abuse of notation, the cell carrying ER n will be called itself ER n .
Of course, Acrt depends only on cells ER n whose arrival time t n is such that t n t we order resource management cells so that t n t n +1 for any n. In ABR, a resource management cell carries a value of Acr, that should be reached as soon as possible. At rst sight, Acrt should then be simply the last ER i received at time t, i.e. ER i with i = lastt, where lastx is the only integer such that t i x t i +1 . Unfortunately, because of electric propagation time and various transmission mechanisms, the user is aware of this expected value only after a delay. T aking the user's reaction time observed by the control device into consideration, that is, the overall round trip time between the control device and the user, Acrt should then be ER i with i = lastt , . But may v ary in turn. ITU-T considers that a lower bound 3 and an upper bound 2 for are established during the negotiation phase of each ABR connection. Hence, a cell arriving from the user at time t on DGCRA may legitimately have been emitted using any rate ER i such that i is between lastt , 2 and lastt , 3 . Any rate less than or equal to any of these values, or, equivalently less than or equal to the maximum of them, should then be allowed. Therefore, Acrt is taken as the maximum of these ER i .
Actually the standards committee did not give these explanations, but directly speci ed the set of ER i under the equivalent form 2 below.
E ective Computation of Acrt
ITU-T committee considered that a direct computation of Acrt is not feasible at reasonable cost with current technologies: it would amount t o compute the maximum of several hundreds integers each time a cell is received from the user. However, it is not di cult to see that Acrt is constant on any interval that contains no value among ft n + j = 2 _ = 3 g. In other words, Acrt is determined by a sequence of values. It then becomes possible to use a scheduler handling future changes of Acrt. This scheduler is updated when a new cell ER n is received. Roughly, i f s is the current time, ER n will be taken into account at time s + 3 , while ER n,1 will not be taken into account after s + 2 .
The control conformance algorithm considered here exploits this idea, with the further constraint that only a small amount of memory is allocated to the scheduler. This means that some information is lost. Filtering is performed in such a way that the actual value of Acrt is greater or equal to its theoretical value, as de ned a b ove.
3 Ideal ACR
Declarative Speci cation
The declarative speci cation S d in the introduction of the ideal value or Acr is given by 1 and 2 under assumption 3. We are given a sequence of RM cells ER i whose arrival date are respectively t i ; the desired allowed cell rate at time t is de ned by : Acrt = maxfER i j i 2 Itg; 1 where I is the interval de ned by : i 2 I t i t , 2 t i t , 3 The initial ine cient ABR conformance control algorithm was a direct computation of Acr according to 1.
Speci cation Using only Finite Knowledge
In practice, only nite pre xes of the sequence t i are available. Then we h a v e to take into account that, given a list l of length l of RM cells ER i whose arrival date are respectively t i , t i+1 makes sense only for i l . H o w ever, if we consider that t l+1 = 1, 4 boils down to l 2 It i t l t , 3 ii Approxls; t is an exact approximation of Acrt for s t , 3: 8t; Acrt = Approxlt , 3 ; t :
Unless otherwise stated s will remain implicit in the following : we will note just l instead of ls. In the same way, v ariables like Efi see below actually handled by the algorithm denote a value that also depends on s, but will be noted just Efi. W e also assume without loss of generality that ER 0 is equal to the initial value of Acr; if the algorithm starts at s 0 , this amounts to stating t 0 = s 0 , 3 Running the algorithm consists of changing the state e into a e 0 . Such a step is called a transition. Here we h a v e essentially two kinds of transitions: the rst is red when receiving a new RM cell, the second is red when the current time reaches the date for a scheduled event.
We basically use standard calculus of weakest preconditions 9 with notations taken from B 1 . Our treatment of time is inspired by timed automata of 3 and the synchrony hypothesis of synchronous languages 11 . We assume that our system reacts more quickly than its environment : state transitions induced by the arrival of a RM cell or due to the scheduler are nished before the arrival of a new RM cell. This assumption depends on the technology used in the real device and can be checked on it. It is then safe to consider that a transition takes no time. Timed automata consider two kinds of transitions: continuous" ones concerning time evolution modeled by clocks and discrete" ones concerning the state.
Here we just need to assume the existence of an external clock, with an internal value s that can be read but not written by programming means. We model the progress of time by an implicit assignment s := current date; for instance s := t k when the k th RM cell is received. The new value of s cannot be smaller than its old value, and we also constrain the new value in a way such that no event arose in the meantime we assume that the scheduler is reliable. Formally, w e consider transitions of the form hs; ei , ! h s 0 ; e 0 i with s s 0 and such that nothing happened between s and s 0 , and where e 0 is the new state obtained from s after running a transition of algorithm B'. This is made explicit in assumptions G e and G i below. It may happen that an internal event i s s c heduled at a time t k . In that case, the internal event has to be handled rst.
Transitions are modeled by program assignments or generalized substitutions" in the terminology of B.
Components of the State
The state e is made of 5 variables : ACR, the current A CR; Efi, the next ACR if nothing new happens; tfi, the date at which Efi will be active if nothing new happens; Ela, containing the value of the last known order ER l ; tla, the date at which Ela will be active if nothing new happens. As an optimization trick, there is a sixth variable Emx whose value is just the maximum of Efi and Ela.
Transitions
The algorithm reacts either when receiving a new ER n , i.e. when the current time reaches t n this is called an external event in the sequel, or when the current time reaches tfi this is called an internal event in the sequel. Each transition changes the current state; an internal event i s s c heduled if and only if tfi is greater than the current time.
Invariant
Here we w ant to ensure that B' provides an ACR which cannot be less than the ideal value Acrs. To this e ect we prove that the following property i s i n v ariant. The complete pseudo-code and the proof are given is appendixes A and B.
Internal Event
Let s be the current time. We consider a transition from s to s 0 = tfi and consistently of es to etfi only if s tfi and there is no external event between s and tfi. F ormally, the following guard is taken for granted: 
Main theorem
Our main result is an easy consequence of previous lemmas. Proof. Using lemma 1 we know that Acrs = Approxl;s. As Inv is actually an invariant, lemma 6 yields Approxl;sACR, hence the result.
For engineers working in the context of standardization, theorem 1 is much more convincing than the similar theorem involving Approx instead of Acr. However it is clear for us that the computational characterization of Approx lemma 4 is much more suited for reasoning about B'. In a rst attempt, we tried to prove directly the invariant I n v using 1 and 2. This resulted in shallow areas and even holes in the manual proof. We also submitted the problem of the correctness of B' to other research teams, in order to assess other approaches. It is too early and beyond the scope of this paper to compare the results of these works, we just give some hints. Model checking using classical and temporal automata is experimented in the framework of FORMA http: www-verimag.imag.fr FORMA, a project founded by the French government which aims at experimenting various formal methods on industrial case studies. In the two rst attempts, the property to be checked corresponded to theorem 1, but modeling Acr contributed to an explosion of the number of states. Moreover the tools used|UPPAAL 6 and MEC 4 |allowed only xed numeric values for 2 , 3 and ER i . Checking the algorithm could be carried through for small values. Later on, good results within two di erent frameworks have been obtained by L . F ribourg 10 and B. B erard 7 , with speci cations based on Approx instead of Acr. In one framework, they used the parameterized temporized automata of Hytech 12 , and in the other an automated proof search procedure due to Revesz 18 was extended to timed automata. In both cases 2 , 3 , etc. were symbolic parameters and the desired property could be checked without the help of Inv. In our case, Inv has been incrementally constructed while attempting to prove I tfs and I Ub1 , following the steps given in appendix B. Note that such calculations are boring and error prone: this is why w e felt that the proof should be checked with a proof assistant. Indeed, our experiment with Coq 15 showed that one of the proofs of appendix B was wrong but could be repaired, fortunately !. A detailed comparison between the approaches mentioned above will be done in a forthcoming paper.
Finally, let us say a w ord on two attempts using B. At CNET we with G. Blorec tried to use this method on this case study two y ears ago. At rst sight B should be well suited, because of our systematic use of substitution calculus. But we failed to handle time and the very notion of scheduler in a nice way; our speci cation was heavy and many proof obligations could not be discharged. Recently, Abrial worked on this problem using an event oriented variant of B and he succeeded to reconstruct an algorithm di erent from the one standardized in I.371, but where the design decisions are much clearer 2 .
Our current feeling is that specialized procedures or methods can discharge boring and painful parts in the veri cation process, but are really successful only on predigested" speci cations like S c , i n c o n trast with S d . On the other side, general purpose frameworks and tools like t ype theory and Coq are helpful on the whole process but still require much more interaction from the user on the parts automatically handled by specialized methods. Work is in progress for integrating both kind of techniques in the same tool.
A Pseudo-code for Algorithm B' 
